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1. Introduction 
One of the most important contributions of the business interest scholarship to studies of 
comparative social policy is the insight that employer opposition or support for welfare is 
not a given, but strongly dependent on the economic and political environment in which 
employers operate. Common explanations of business support for welfare provisions focus 
on the moral convictions of enlightened entrepreneurs, the need for skilled workers, or the 
possibility to avoid taxation by shifting corporate profits into benefit plans (cf. Sass 1997; 
Nijhof 2009). Business interest scholars have complicated these views by showing how 
factors such as the degree of exposure to international markets or the reliance on generic 
or specific skills in the labor force explain variation in business preferences within, but also 
across political economies (cf. Swenson 1991; Mares 2003). Moreover, these scholars have 
shown important variation over time, as employers responded to political challenges posed 
by labor unions and the state (Hacker and Pierson 2002; Paster 2013). Depending on 
contextual factors, employers can therefore act as protagonists, antagonists or consenters 
towards social policy (Korpi 2006).  
 The current chapter will explore how the financialization of the political economy 
during the last quarter of the 20th century has influenced business preferences for 
occupational pensions. Financialization refers to “the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions” (Epstein 2005: 3). In few areas 
of the welfare state has financialization been as pronounced as in the area of occupational 
pensions. Occupational pensions can be financed in various ways: for instance, through 
book reserves, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, or by capital funding. Because capital 
funding allows pension savings to grow over time beyond the mere sum of contributions, 
it has become a preferred policy option to deal with the budgetary challenges associated 
with demographic ageing (e.g. World Bank 1994). Additionally, states have tried to offset 
budgetary pressures on the first pillar of the pension system (state pensions) by 
incentivizing pension provisions within the second pillar (occupational pensions), a 
process known as pension privatization (Ebbinghaus 2011). The result is a growing 
importance of the second pillar in pension systems across political economies, coinciding 
with growing dependence of occupational pensions on investment in financial markets.   
Capital-funded pension schemes, however, do not automatically lower the costs of 
occupational pensions; they also introduce new kinds of risk. In the case of capital funding, 
risk stems from the performance of pension plan assets in financial markets: while the logic 
behind capital funding starts from the assumption that investment of plan assets will 
generate positive returns, there is always the chance that in fact losses will be incurred. 
Who carries the investment risk associated with capital-funded occupational pensions 
depends on the nature of the pension plan. Defined Benefit (DB) plans, that promise a 
particular pension outcome, commonly attribute the risk to employers. Should 
underfunding occur, employers will need to either increase their contributions to the plan 
or make repair payments. In the case of Defined Contribution (DC) pension plans, whereby 
not the benefit but the contribution rates are guaranteed, such investments risks fall to the 
beneficiary of the plan, the employee.  
 The central argument proposed in this chapter is that capital funding has important 
ramifications for business preferences towards occupational pensions. With capital 
funding, the extent to which these plans can protect against the social risks associated with 
old age has become partially dependent on the financial risks stemming from capital 
funding. Financialization thus turns an influential argument in the business interests 
scholarship on its head, namely that, depending on size and industry, employers might be 
willing to incur higher risks to gain more control over social welfare provisions (Mares 
2003): as financialization reduces the possibilities for control over occupational pension 
provisions, employers will be more likely to adopt political preferences aimed at risk 
reduction. Contrary to the traditional focus point of welfare state scholarship, the financial 
politics of occupational pensions does not necessarily manifest itself as a distributive 
conflict between business, labor and the state. Equally important are political contestations 
over funding rules for pension plans or the investment of plan assets, as well as the impact 
of pension liabilities on corporate finance. The financial politics of occupational pensions 
thus occupies a different terrain than normally associated with occupational pension 
provisions.  
As plan sponsors, employers have a strong stake in the financial politics of 
occupational pensions. Solvency rules that impose funding levels on pension plans 
determine whether contributions need to be raised or can be lowered. Accounting standards 
determine how pension liabilities should appear on corporate accounts. The visibility of 
these pension liabilities shapes the ability of the corporation to attract outside investors. 
Investment rules determine the extent to which pension assets can be invested in particular 
asset categories. For employers, asset categories with higher rates of return are more 
attractive, because they may allow them to lower contributions. For these reasons, we 
would expect employers and their interest organizations to take strong positions on each of 
these three policy issues: solvency rules that minimize the financial burden on the plan 
sponsor, less stringent reporting requirements of pension liabilities, and relatively liberal 
investment rules that give large discretionary power to investment managers. In this 
chapter, employer preferences vis-à-vis these three policy area will be further explored.  
 The argument presented here will be advanced through a comparative case study of 
the United States and the Netherlands. Both the United States and the Netherlands have 
mature, three-pillar pension. When it comes to the institutional characteristics of each 
system, however, the United States and the Netherlands constitute most different cases. In 
the Netherlands, almost all private sector workers participate in occupational pension plans, 
while plan coverage in the United States is low. Additionally, Dutch occupational pension 
plans are overwhelmingly defined benefit (DB), whereas in the United States defined 
contribution (DC) plans dominate. Finally, the Dutch pension system has strong corporatist 
features: unions bargain collectively with employers over occupational pension plans at the 
company or industry level; unions and employers jointly define pension policy within 
corporatist institutions at the national level; and, employees (and retiree) representatives 
jointly govern pension funds with employers. In the United States, by contrast, joint 
governance is only required for multi-employers pension funds.   
 Yet, while important institutional differences exist between the American and 
Dutch pension systems, they share a strong likeness when it comes to the influence of 
financial markets on pension outcomes. In both pension systems, capital funding is the 
legally mandated method of financing for occupational pensions. Additionally, both 
pension systems have relatively liberal investment regimes. Instead of substantive 
investment restrictions, which are common in other political economies, Dutch and 
American pension assets need to be invested in accordance with an open legal norm, the 
prudent person rule. Finally, capitalization rates of both pension systems are well above 
the OECD average of 37.1%, namely 79.4% for the United States and 171.4% for the 
Netherlands in 2015 (OECD 2017a). With both pension systems deeply entrenched in 
global financial markets, we should therefore expect a similar financial politics of 
occupational pensions in both pension system regardless of their institutional differences. 
In this chapter, I will compare business groups’ positions vis-à-vis occupational 
pensions in the Netherlands and the United States from the 1980s until today. Dutch 
employers are represented by the VNO-NCW (Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen- 
Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversbond), a federation of employer associations 
representing almost all large Dutch enterprises and 80% of medium-sized firms among its 
membership. Its American counterparts are the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business 
Roundtable and the National Association of Manufacturers. The American Benefits 
Council is a lobby organization in the area of occupational benefits, representing large 
employers. The political preferences held by these organizations will be inferred from the 
positions communicated in white papers, brochures, issue briefs and other publications. 
Other sources of evidence include congressional or parliamentary documents related to 
occupational pension reform and documents produced by consultative bodies in the 
Netherlands, such as the Socio-Economic Council, and for the American case, documents 
related to public consultations on occupational pensions.  
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 1 will further elaborate on the 
financial politics of workplace pensions by addressing what does this financial politics 
entail and how it corresponds with scholarly insights on the social politics of workplace 
pensions. Section 2 will introduce the two case studies of the United States and the 
Netherlands by giving a brief outline of recent developments in both pension systems. The 
next three sections will subsequently address one of the main issues associated with the 
financial politics of workplace pensions: issues of plan funding, the impact of pension 
liabilities on corporate finance in light of the financialization of the modern firm, and the 
role of pension funds as financial intermediaries. In all three sections, the positions of 
business federations will be taken as the point of departure.  
 
2. The Financial Politics of Occupational Pensions  
The investment of pension capital in financial markets, argued here to be one manifestation 
of a broader process known as financialization, has greatly facilitated the expansion of 
occupational pension provisions. Thanks to fortuitous financial market conditions during 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, pension assets have grown exponentially: in 2016, 
private pension assets reached $38 trillion worldwide (OECD 2017b). Capital funding has 
not only made possible the growth of savings beyond the initial contributions. It has also 
created a concentration of capital that can be used for investment in the productive 
economy. For that reason, the expansion of capital-funded pensions has not only been 
sought by groups directly benefiting from these provisions (e.g. workers and unions), but 
also by actors seeking indirect returns from pension investment (e.g. state and business 
actors) (Estevez-Abe 2001; McCarthy 2017). Financialization, however, has increased the 
exposure of occupational pension plans to volatilities in global financial markets. The 
extent to which these plans can protect against the social risks associated with old age has 
therefore become partially dependent on the financial risks stemming from capital funding.   
The financial risks associated with capital-funded occupational pension plans are 
mitigated by institutional arrangements, in particular plan design and plan governance. 
Occupational pensions are generally Defined Benefit (DB) plans, Defined Contribution 
(DC) plans, or a combination thereof. DB pensions guarantee a particular outcome at 
retirement, for instance 70% of a beneficiary’s average salary. DC pensions, on the 
contrary, are schemes with fixed contribution rates, but variable outcomes at retirement. 
The height of the pension is based on the investment returns accumulated during the 
beneficiary’s career. Particularly DB plans can be costly for employers, since the plan 
sponsor is responsible for delivering the promised benefit: should the plan be underfunded, 
then the sponsor is expected to remedy the situation by increasing contributions or making 
a capital injection into the fund.  
Plan governance also mediates the impact of financial risks. Occupational pension 
plans are managed either by single-employer funds (in the Netherlands: company pension 
funds) or by multi-employer (industry) pension funds. In the case of multi-employer funds, 
important risks associated with DB pension plans, such as longevity risk or investment risk, 
can be shared within the collective. Multi-employer funds might have an additional 
advantage over single-employer funds, as these funds often have labor representatives on 
their boards of trustees. Evidence suggests that labor unions have a moderating impact on 
financial volatility, as their board presence translates into more conservative investment 
policies (Wiβ 2015). By extension, pension funds in coordinated market economies seem 
to experience less financial volatility and losses than in liberal market economies due to 
the strong entrenchment of labor unions in these systems (Wiβ 2015).  
Yet, the risk associated with the investment of pension assets does not just make 
plan funding unpredictable. It also affects the corporation’s position in the financial 
marketplace. As with occupational pensions, the nature of corporate finance has changed 
drastically since the 1980s as a result of the modern corporation’s growing reliance on 
stock market financing (Van der Zwan 2014). Stock market financing has reinforced the 
position of the shareholder in the firm. Corporate activities are increasingly aimed at 
satisfying shareholders’ demands for return on investment. Business practices associated 
with a shareholder value orientation include the dismantlement of corporate conglomerates 
for a focus on “core business activities,” share value as measure of corporate performance, 
and a focus on short-term results (Davis 2009). Public corporations may also perceive 
pressures to abandon DB pension plans, as shareholders tend to respond negatively to large 
pension liabilities (Dixon and Monk 2009). While these changes have been most 
pronounced in Anglo-American political economies, scholarship suggests that similar 
developments have taken place in the continental European political economies as well 
(Van der Zwan 2014). 
While the financialization of occupational pensions poses additional risks, 
employers have had few opportunities to control such risks. Pension funds commonly 
outsource asset management of their plans to external investment firms. The further 
removed the investment of plan assets from the plan sponsor, the more difficult it becomes 
for the plan sponsor to exert influence over the investments (Ebbinghaus and Wiβ 2011). 
Employers will therefore have to resort to other means to reduce the financial risks 
associated with occupational pensions, most importantly changes to plan design. Hacker 
(2004), for instance, considers the growing popularity of DC pension plans in the United 
States part of a broader “risk shift,” whereby both state and business actors offload the risks 
associated with the provision of retirement security onto individual workers. Short of a 
complete transition to DC pensions, employers may also change the conditions of their DB 
plans, such introducing a contributions cap or removing the responsibility to make repair 
payments (Bridgen and Meyer 2009). Financialization thus alters the balancing act of risk 
and control that shape employers’ preferences towards social policy: absent control over 
global financial markets, employers will seek out alternative means of risk reduction.  
Paradoxically, then, financialization may increase calls on the state for additional 
regulation. Where employers deem a switch from DB to DC pension plans undesirable or 
politically unfeasible, state regulation offers an alternative means to reduce risk. Scholars 
of business interests have commonly seen state regulation as a factor inhibiting the 
expansion of private welfare provisions. According to Hacker, for instance, the “essential 
dilemma raised by subsidized private benefits” is that “any regulation that drives up costs 
or interferes with corporate goals will undoubtedly reduce the incentive of employers to 
sponsor benefits in the first place” (2002: 157; see also, Meyer and Bridgen 2012). In the 
case of capital-funded pensions, however, state regulation can smoothen financial market 
shocks and thus make capital-funded pension plans more stable and secure. For that reason, 
both business groups and labor unions have sought regulation in this area.  
In what follows, this argument will be underscored by comparing the financial 
politics of occupational pensions in the United States and the Netherlands around three 
issues: solvency rules, financial disclosure rules, and corporate governance regulation. In 
particular, the analysis will show that in both political economies, business groups have 
sought financial rules that reduce requirements for employers to raise contributions or 
make repair payments in situations of underfunding, disclosure rules that downplay the role 
of pension liabilities on the corporate account, and corporate governance rules that limit 
shareholder activism. 
 
3. Risk and Control in Two Pension Systems 
Both the United States and the Netherlands have mature, three-pillar pension systems. 
Occupational pensions have been in place in both political economies since the late 19th 
century, for instance at American Express in the United States (1875) and the Delftse Gist- 
en Spiritusfabriek, a chemical company (1886), in the Netherlands. Many of these early 
schemes had strict eligibility rules and payout of benefits was uncertain. In both systems, 
occupational pensions were traditionally seen as gifts, which the employer bestowed upon 
his employees. For that reason, they were left relatively unregulated by the state. In both 
political economies, moreover, the number of occupational pension plans increased rapidly 
in the postwar period: the difficulty to attract skilled workers during wartime, post-war 
labor union mobilization, and the introduction of universal state pension schemes, each of 
these factors contributed to the expansion of private pension provisions (Van der Zwan 
2017).  
In a similar vein, the failure of two workplace pension plans as a result of employer 
bankruptcy – the Koninklijke Hollandsche Lloyd in the Netherlands (1935) and the 
Studebaker car manufacturer in the United States (1963) – provided the impetus for new 
pension legislation in both countries. Both the Pension and Savings Fund Act (Pensioen- 
en Spaarfondsenwet, 1952) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (1974) 
imposed several restrictions on occupational plans in order to safeguard employees’ 
pensions: the pension plan had to be managed by a legal entity separate from the sponsoring 
corporation; the pension plan had to be financed by capital funding; and investment of plan 
assets in the sponsoring corporation were restricted. The effect of these legal rules has been 
the creation of pension funds as large financial intermediaries, legally detached from the 
sponsoring firm, in search of investment opportunities within global financial markets.  
Despite these commonalities, the institutional differences between the American 
and Dutch pension systems remain vast. First, most Dutch employers are required to offer 
an occupational pension scheme to their employees, while the American second pillar 
remains voluntarist. Consequently, participation rates in the Netherlands are high (96%), 
but relatively low in the United States (50% of private sector workers) (DNB 2017a; 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). Second, pension fund governance differs in both systems. 
Dutch employer associations and labor unions bargain collectively over occupational 
pension schemes. They are also jointly responsible for pension fund governance. In the 
United States, bipartite governance is only required for multi-employer plans, which cover 
a minority of private sector workers (18% of workers with DB plans) (BLS 2016). Third, 
corporatism characterizes pension policy-making in the Netherlands, but not in the United 
States. The Socio-Economic Council, in which employer and labor unions are represented 
alongside academic expert, serves as an important advisory body to the Dutch government.  
The institutional contexts of the Dutch and American pension systems present 
employers with very different possibilities for discretionary action, when it comes to 
occupational pensions. The position of Dutch employers is constrained by institutional 
features such as the mandatory extension of collectively bargained pension plans, tripartite 
governance of pension funds boards, and regulations stemming from the national and 
supranational levels. These features do not only make it more difficult for Dutch employers 
to opt out of the pension system, but also restrict their ability to change the second pillar 
from within. American employers, meanwhile, benefit from a high degree of voluntarism 
within the second pillar. There is no (quasi-)mandate to offer an occupational pension plan 
to employees and labor unions tend to be weak when it comes to pension fund governance 
(McCarthy 2017). For these reasons, it is expected that Dutch employers will be less likely 
than American employers to translate their policy preferences into actual policy change.  
The discretionary power of American employers over occupational pensions has 
manifested itself in the widespread adoption of defined contribution (DC) pension plans, 
since the passage of ERISA in 1974. The number of private sector workers with a DB 
pension plan has since dropped from more than 80% in the early 1980s to 15% in 2017 
(Ghilarducci 2008; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). More than half of private industry 
workers and around 20% of public sector workers do not participate in occupational 
pension plans to begin with. Scholars have attributed the switch from DB to DC plans to 
several factors. Some have pointed at the preferential regulatory treatment of DC plans, 
particularly 401(k) plans, over DB plans in terms of tax advantages and reporting 
requirements (Zelinsky 2007). Others have attributed these changes in private welfare to 
American class politics. To them, the widespread dismissal of DB plans is representative 
of the political weakening of organized labor vis-à-vis business (McCarthy 2017). Finally, 
scholars argue that the decline in DB plans reflects broader shifts in the American 
economy, such as de-unionization, deindustrialization and the flexibilization of 
employment. They find that DB plans are more common among unionized firms, among 
manufacturing firms and among workers with longer careers (Hacker 2002).  
The DB pension plans that remain are facing several challenges. First, many DB 
plans are severely underfunded. According to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(2015), the total deficit of its insured single-employer and multi-employer plans ran almost 
$900 billion in 2014. State and local government employee pension plans face similar 
problems. Mitchell (2014) estimates that fifteen states will exhaust their state pension fund 
assets before the year 2025. Second, where large deficits exist, some employers have opted 
to suspend DB pension benefits or freeze their DB pension plans entirely. Since the turn of 
the century, pension freezes have occurred at several large manufacturing corporations, 
including Bethlehem Steel (2002), Polaroid (2002), and IBM (2006). Third, some 
employers have undertaken so-called “de-risking” activities, whereby regular pension 
benefits are replaced by lump sum payments or transferred to an insurance company. 
According to Maher (2016), pension “de-risking” has involved over $100 billion in recent 
years at well-known corporations, such as General Motors, Ford and Motorola. The effect 
of these developments has been a further risk transfer from employers to employees and 
retirees participating in DB pension plans.   
The financial risk for American DB plans is partially offset by a public insurance 
system, run by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC is a federal 
agency that takes over pension liabilities in case a DB pension plan is terminated due to 
financial distress of the sponsoring firm. The agency is financed by insurance premiums 
for each plan participant in the system, which are charged to sponsoring employers. Over 
the years, these rates have steadily increased: from a $1 rate per participant at the agency’s 
inception in 1974, to $69 per participant in 2017. The PBGC also charges employers a 
variable rate premium for unfunded pension liabilities. In 2017, the variable rate was $34 
per participant for each $1000 in unfunded pension liabilities (PBGC 2015). Nonetheless, 
the PBGC is facing large deficits: $20.5 billion for the single-employer program and $58.8 
billion for the multi-employer program in 2016 (PBGC 2015). The deficit is caused 
predominantly by large terminations in the past, particularly in the airline and metal 
industries (PBGC 2015). In 2005, for instance, United Airlines defaulted on its DB pension 
plans, moving a historic $10 billion in unfunded pension liabilities to the PBGC. 
At first sight, the Netherlands remains a bulwark of DB pensions: only 9.15% of 
pension schemes are DC (DNB 2017). Yet, since the mid-1990s, changes to DB pension 
plans have gradually shifted risks from employers to employees. In 1997, for instance, the 
social partners and the state signed a Covenant on Occupational Pensions, in which the 
social partners committed to reduce pension costs by replacing more expensive final salary 
pension plans with average salary plans. By 2001, around a third of all fund members 
participated in an average salary plan, against 15% in 1989 (Werkgroep 
Evaluatieonderzoek Convenant Arbeidspensioenen 2001). During the same period, 
moreover, almost all pension funds made indexation of pension rights conditional on 
investment performance, covering around 90,4% of active participants (Werkgroep 
Evaluatieonderzoek Convenant Arbeidspensioenen 2001). Finally, a growing number of 
large employers have shifted from DB pension plans to Collective Defined Contribution 
(CDC) plans over the last two decades. By adopting a new plan design, these employers 
have severed the ties between the occupational pension fund and the sponsoring firm.   
While not as profound as in the United States, the risk shift that has taken place in 
the Netherlands has had direct impact on pension outcomes. Average funding rates dropped 
after the financial crises of 2001 and 2008: from 199% in 199 to 124% in 2001 and further 
down to 95% by the end of 2008 (DNB 2017). While the 2001 crisis provided the impetus 
for a broad shift towards average salary DB plans and conditional indexation, the 2008 
crisis saw the effects of these measures: with contribution increases political unfeasible, 
several pension funds had to take the unprecedented action of reducing the pension 
entitlements of active and retired workers. According the Dutch Central Bank, these 
cutbacks affected around 5.6 million people in 2013 and about 2.5 million people in 2014 
(DNB 2013, 2014). To place these numbers in perspective: in both years, the Dutch pension 
funds counted around 5.5 million among their active members and around 3.1 million 
retirees (DNB 2013, 2014). 
Both American and Dutch occupational pension provisions have undergone 
profound changes, associated with the risk shift as described by Hacker (2002). 
Remarkably, these changes occurred despite relative institutional stability within both 
pension systems. Furthermore, while profound shifts taking place in the United States can 
undoubtedly be at least partially explained by the declining power of organized labor, such 
explanations do not hold for the Netherlands, where labor unions continue to occupy strong 
institutionalized positions within the pension system. Instead, I argue that the policy 
changes taking place in both pension systems should be considered against the background 
of increased financial risks, stemming from financialization. In what follows, I will focus 
on three policy areas in which employers have lobbied for new rules and regulations in 
attempts to offset these new financial risks: solvency rules, disclosure requirements and 
investment rules.  
 
4. Keeping Pension Funds Solvent 
Occupational pension plans can either impose large burdens on employers or become 
lucrative windfalls, depending on market conditions largely outside of their control. 
Favorable stock markets in the 1980s and 1990s provided a boost to funding levels in both 
the United States and the Netherlands. Employers profited from pension funds’ good 
financial performance in several ways. Between 1980 and 1989, for instance, American 
employers transferred some $20 billion in excess assets back to the sponsoring corporation, 
in many cases terminating their DB plans and replacing them with DC plans (Kosterlitz 
1989). In the Netherlands, employers likewise awarded themselves a number of financial 
perks, such as contribution refunds and premium holidays (Tamerus 2011). Such practices 
came to a screeching halt, however, when financial market conditions changed 
dramatically at the turn of the century: the burst of the tech bubble in 2001 heralded a new 
period of stock market volatility and low long-term interest rates, which both negatively 
affected funding levels in pension funds. Employers thus faced a new challenge: how to 
keep pension plans solvent amidst fluctuating investment performance, when the 
performance of these plans depended on markets outside of their control?  
In both the United States and the Netherlands, the events of 2001 provided the 
impetus for legislative reform of the solvency rules for pension funds. The Bush 
Administration initiated the first major overhaul of American pension legislation since 
ERISA in 1974. The President’s reform plan was not just motivated by the financial crisis, 
but also by corporate scandals such as at Enron, that had brought to light the 
misappropriation of employee pension savings by employers. The resultant 2006 Pension 
Protection Act introduced new funding rules for pension funds: DB plan liabilities had to 
be fully funded or otherwise amortized over a 7-year period. Plans facing underfunding 
would be considered endangered or, in more severe cases, “at risk.” Depending on the 
degree of underfunding, employers would need to make repair payments, avoid benefits 
increases or even freeze benefits entirely. Similar rules were established for multi-
employer plans (Ghilarducci 2008; Zelinsky 2007).  
 While business groups generally expressed agreement with the intent behind the 
legislation, they were critical of several elements of the Pension Protection Act. Together 
with other business groups, the four organizations studied here formed a coalition to lobby 
Congress for changes to the legislation. According to the American Benefits Council 
(2005: 1), it was imperative that “funding obligations are neither artificially inflated nor 
volatile, thus preventing employers from abandoning the system because of adverse effects 
on business planning.” Opposition not only focused on the more stringent funding rules for 
DB rules. Business groups also strongly resisted reform of the PBGC’s premium structure. 
To remedy its funding problems, the PBGC proposed to switch to a risk-based premium 
structure: premiums for well-funded plans would be cut, while those for at-risk plans would 
be increased. In a joint letter to Congress, the coalition stated it would be “inappropriate” 
for a government agency to make “formal pronouncements about the financial status of 
American businesses” (American Benefits Council et al. 2011). Finally, the coalition 
criticized the restrictions on self-investment in 401(k) plans and advocated permanent 
funding relief for multi-employer plans (American Benefits Council et al. 2011).  
 The 2008 financial crisis exacerbated business opposition to the Pension Protection 
Act. Estimates suggest that DB plan funding levels had dropped 13 percentage points to an 
average of 85% by October 2008 (Munnell et al. 2008). Declining performance, mostly 
due to depressed stock market performance, threatened plan funding levels with the legal 
requirement to make substantial repair payments: an estimated $90 billion for the year 2009 
alone (Munnell et al. 2008). Again, a broad coalition of business groups called on Congress 
to postpone the PPA’s funding requirements, citing poor financial market performance and 
the Fed’s low interest rate regimes (American Benefits Council 2012). Their opposition 
proved successful: in various rounds of legislation, the PPA’s funding standards for single-
employer and multi-employer pension funds were slowly reduced. Labor unions supported 
funding relief for DB plans as well, albeit reluctantly. The AFL-CIO hoped to make 
funding relief conditional on employers’ promise not to freeze benefit for the foreseeable 
future (Halonen 2010). The labor federation’s opposition proved unsuccessful. Per new 
2014 rules, it has become possible to suspend pension benefits for multi-employer pension 
plans were made possible. 
In the Netherlands, solvency requirements for pension funds also underwent 
important changes from the late 1990s onwards. Previously, pension plans had to be either 
reinsured with commercial insurance companies or managed in accordance with actuarial 
principles under the supervision of the Dutch Central Bank. Consultations with the social 
partners resulted in new solvency requirements in 2005 (Stichting van de Arbeid 2004). 
Starting points of these requirements was the maintenance of nominal pension entitlements 
and the creation of capital buffers. To this end, a minimum funding level of 105% was 
introduced. Pension funds would have to organize their asset management to ensure a 
97.5% certainty that funding levels would not drop below 100%. Meanwhile, contribution 
rates would have to cover not just nominal entitlements, but also buffer requirements, 
indexation measures and the costs of fund management (Tamerus 2011).  
The new financial framework (financieel toetsingskader, FTK) came into operation 
right at the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. As funding levels plummeted and many 
pension funds had to submit repair plans to the Central Bank, social partners began to 
experience the constraints of the FTK. According to the Dutch Labour Foundation, the 
FTK institutionalized two conflicting goals for occupational pension plans. On the one 
hand, nominal pension entitlements presumed stable funding levels and sufficient financial 
buffers. On the other hand, pension funds had to realize indexation of pension entitlements, 
which presumed investment risk (STAR 2013). When the Minister of Social Affairs 
announced a new broad-scale reform of the pension system in 2009, the social partners 
therefore advocated new funding rules that would make contributions and outcomes 
“independent of daily fluctuations in financial markets” (STAR 2013: 2). In 2010, social 
partners agreed on a new Pension Accord, that included the following policy changes: a 
ten-year period to amortize financial shocks; an automatic adjustment mechanism to tie 
retirement age to increases in life expectancy; and the calculation of funding ratios over a 
twelve-month period (STAR 2013). The new legislation also made an end to some of the 
control employers had over the financial management of the pension plans, by banning the 
possibility of contribution holidays or refunds to the corporation (STAR 2013). 
In short,  from the turn of the century onwards, employers in both countries began 
to feel the constraints of the financial marketplace. Financial market volatility not only 
impacted the costs of occupational pension plans. As firms themselves became more reliant 
on market financing, other pressures associated with financialization became apparent as 
well. These will be explored in the next section.  
  
5. Occupational Pensions and the Financialized Corporation  
The financialization of the modern corporation forms another source of risk, associated 
with pension plans’ methods of funding, particularly in the case of DB pensions. DB 
pension plans combine a strong pension promise, such as 70% of the average enjoyed 
salary, with the uncertainties stemming from financial market investment. Since employers 
ultimately carry the risks in these plans, their costs of sponsoring the pension plan may 
fluctuate from one year to the next, depending on the investment performance of the fund. 
For this reason, investors tend to consider large DB pension liabilities as perilous to the 
realization of shareholder value. Credit rating agencies are likewise known to penalize 
public firms for the existence of DB pension plans, particularly when underfunded (Dixon 
and Monk 2009). For this reason, firms with a strong reliance on financial markets might 
want to reduce or altogether eliminate the financial risks associated with DB pension plans.  
 Due to financial markets’ penalization of firms with large DB pension liabilities, 
business groups have not welcomed legislative proposals to increase corporate disclosure 
of such liabilities. In the United States, for instance, policymakers involved in the Pension 
Protection Act suggested tying reporting standards for at-risk plans to a corporation’s credit 
ratings. If credit-rating agencies considered particular firms to be risky investments and 
assign below-investment grade evaluations, so the logic was, wouldn’t this also mean these 
firms’ pension plans were at risk? Business groups disagreed. According to the American 
Benefits Council (2004: 22), “such misleading disclosures could unnecessarily and falsely 
alarm employees, financial markets, and shareholders.” When the PBGC similarly 
proposed more stringent reporting requirements for the same category of firms, both the 
American Benefits Council (2010) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2013) opposed 
the proposal. In both cases, business opposition was successful.  
 Reporting requirements stemming from international accounting standards have 
furthermore exacerbated the penalization of DB pension liabilities in global financial 
markets. Accounting standards set rules for how companies need to report their pension 
liabilities on their annual corporate statements. In the European Union, corporations need 
to follow International Accounting Standard 19, part of the International Accounting 
Standard Board’s (IASB) International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Central to 
IAS 19 is the notion of “fair value” accounting, requiring firms to report the market value 
of their pension assets and liabilities on their corporate accounts (Perry and Nölke 2006). 
According to Dixon and Monk (2009: 625), fair value accounting is contradictory to the 
very nature of pension liabilities: “In effect, fair value redirects short-term fluctuations in 
the pension funds (which are by their very nature long-term institutions), directly into 
short-term corporate financial statements.” In the United States, the Financial Accounting 
Board (FASB) has required plan sponsor to use similar accounting methods. The FASB 
and the IASB aim to harmonize their standards, with the goal of establishing one method 
of valuating firms across the globe.  
 Unsurprisingly, neither American nor Dutch employer associations have shown 
strong support for the harmonization of international accounting standards. In the United 
States, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2012: 13) condemned the reporting standards, 
stating that these standards “have discouraged the continuation of defined benefit pension 
and retiree health care plans.” According to the Chamber, “FASB’s requirements create a 
picture of immediacy on the balance sheet for a defined benefit plan even though it is to be 
funded and perpetuated over the course of decades” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2012: 
13). Likewise, the Dutch VNO-NWC has lobbied extensively against the IAS 19 
provisions. A broad coalition of organized business, labor unions, and pension funds called 
on the Dutch government to negotiate an exemption for DB plans in Brussels. In 2013, the 
business federation announced a compromise had been reached: if the pension plan 
contained a contribution ceiling for the employer, then the firm would be able to treat a DB 
plan as a DC plan in its corporate account and only report paid contributions (VNO-NCW 
2012). 
 While VNO-NCW celebrated the 2013 modification of IAS19 as a victory, 
however, Dutch employers have nonetheless abandoned their company pension funds in 
large numbers. Since the introduction of IAS 19 in 2005, more than 70% company pension 
funds have disappeared, either through liquidation or merger with other pension funds. At 
least some of this decline can be attributed to the new pension accounting standards, 
particularly among the Netherlands’ largest corporations. Swinkels (2011) shows how 
immediately after the implementation of IAS 19 in 2006 already 12 of the 44 largest Dutch 
company pension plans announced plan to place their company pension funds “at a 
distance” from the firm. Other large employers have followed suit since then, including 
Philips, ING and ABN AMRO. Consider how ABN AMRO (2014) announced its new 
Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) plan: “With the [new pension plan], ABN AMRO 
removes the volatility in its balance sheet and capital position introduced by the revised 
pension accounting standard IAS 19 and reduces volatility in its pension expenses.” 
 Severing the ties between a company pension fund and the sponsoring firm, 
however, comes at a cost. Some of these costs are purely financial. When Dutch employers 
wish to place a company pension fund “at a distance” from the firm - for instance, by 
ending repair payment requirements or introducing contribution ceilings - they need to win 
the support from labor unions. In return for union support, employers often commit to hefty 
compensation packages. Mining company DSM, for instance, promised to pay extra 
pension contributions of 21% of the wage sum (amounting to €99 million) when it 
negotiated a collective defined contribution scheme in 2006, while SNS Bank contributed 
a one-time payment of €105 million to its pension fund to accomplish the same goal (Van 
Bergen 2005). Once company pension funds become independent from the sponsoring 
employer, the latter also loses control over the fund’s management, including its 
investment policy. Loss of control also occurs when a company pension fund merges with 
an industry pension fund. Such mergers have also grown more common in recent years 
(DNB 2017b).   
  
6. Pension Funds as Financial Intermediaries  
Pension funds in both political economies have always been relatively free to invest. In the 
United States, pension fund assets should be invested in accordance with the prudent 
person rule: using care, due diligence and a sufficient degree of diversification. Likewise, 
Dutch pension funds were guided by the open norm that pension assets be invested “in a 
solid manner,” until the prudent person rule was introduced in 2008. In both political 
economies, the most important restriction on pension fund investments are legal limits on 
investments by single-employer pension funds in corporate stock of the sponsoring firm: 
10% in the United States and 5% in the Netherlands. These legal rules severely limit the 
ability of employers to mobilize pension capital for investment in the corporation. In 
response to the Enron scandal in 2001, the Pension Protection Act initially suggested 
similar restrictions for self-directed DC pension plans, whereby the employee makes the 
investment decisions. American business groups successfully opposed the PPA’s limits on 
self-investment and no such legal provisions ended up in the final legislation (Ghilarducci 
2008).   
Ironically, as pension funds have gained more autonomy from the sponsoring firm, 
they have increasingly been able to exert influence over the corporation. As large financial 
intermediaries, pension funds have vast ownership stakes in public corporations. As large 
owners of corporate shares of stock, pension funds are no longer able to sell shares without 
affecting market values. Instead, they will wield their powers as shareholders to influence 
corporate decision-making, a phenomenon known as active ownership (Hebb 2008). 
Shareholder engagement is often aimed at increasing shareholder value or introducing 
other measures to strengthen the position of the shareholder within the corporation.  Such 
activities can be at odds with the preferences of the employer. In the United States, for 
instance, the role of pension funds in the takeover movement of the 1980s was widely 
questioned (Van der Zwan 2017). As pension funds have gained an important degree of 
autonomy from the plan sponsor, therefore, their interests and those of employers are no 
longer automatically aligned.  
Dutch pension funds have similarly embraced active ownership. Corporate 
engagement by pension funds entered the Netherlands in the context of the European 
takeover movement of the 1990s. While large industry pension funds, such as public sector 
fund ABP, announced they would protect Dutch firms against hostile takeovers, several 
company pension funds desired an end to protective measures against takeovers (Butijn 
and Schoutendorp 1995; Tamminga 1995). A Committee on Corporate Governance, 
chaired by Unilever CEO Peters, was subsequently tasked with updating corporate 
governance guidelines for Dutch firms. The committee explicitly stated that pension fund 
beneficiaries would benefit from good corporate governance and therefore proposed a 
stronger influence of capital providers, “in particular institutional investors” (Commissie 
voor Corporate Governance 1997). Both business and labor groups alike adopted the 
committee’s view that proxy voting is an essential element of pension investing. Still, 
VNO-NCW (2017) repeated earlier appeals to Dutch pension funds to act as so-called 
anchor owners, when it recently called on Dutch pension funds to block foreign hostile 
takeovers of Dutch corporations.  
 The absence of direct control over pension fund assets notwithstanding, different 
actors in the political economy have tried to harness the investment power of pension funds. 
In both the Netherlands and the United States, government administrations during the 
1980s used the threat of taxation to force pension funds to increase their investments in the 
domestic productive economy (Van der Zwan 2017). More recently, the Rutte 
Administration has called on Dutch pension funds to reduce foreign investments and 
instead help stimulate the post-financial crisis Dutch economy. Labor unions, particularly 
in the United States, have similarly tried to gain a piece of the pension pot. With labor 
federation AFL-CIO in a coordinating role, American unions have adopted a “capital 
stewardship” approach, in which they use shareholder engagement to effectuate changes 
in corporate policies. American, organizing proxy campaigns amongst its member-
affiliated pension funds (Van der Zwan 2011). Often, these campaigns have a social or 
political orientation. In the wake of the Supreme Court decision on Citizens United (2010), 
for instance, the AFL-CIO and other labor-shareholders have submitted shareholder 
proposals on disclosure of corporate expenditures on political activities.  
 American business groups have actively lobbied to legally prohibit unions and other 
political organizations to use the proxy process for their activism. To employers, 
shareholder campaigns are a big nuisance: not only do they impose costs on the firm, but 
the negative publicity associated with these campaigns may also cause reputational damage 
to the firm. The various political actions undertaken by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
are exemplary in this regard. Not only has the Chamber pressed for a legislative ban on 
social or political investment of pension assets, it has also pursued legal actions against 
activist pension funds as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission, that is 
responsible for regulating the proxy process (Hebb 2008). In 2007, for instance, the 
Chamber urged the Department of Labor to ban any pension investment that would “further 
public policy debates and political activities through proxy resolutions that have no 
connection to enhancing the cause of the plan’s investment in a company” (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2007).   
   
7. Conclusion 
From an institutionalist perspective, the pension systems in the Netherlands and the United 
States could not be more different: (quasi-)mandatory versus voluntary participation, 
bipartite governance versus employer unilateralism, and corporatist policy-making versus 
adversarial politics, respectively. Yet, the strong emphasis on institutions in welfare state 
scholarship, and scholarship on comparative political economy in general, hides one 
important similarity between the two systems: the predominance of capital funding in the 
occupational pension system. While business interest scholars have emphasized the 
importance of exposure to competition in international production markets to explain 
employer support for social policy (cf. Swenson 1991; Mares 2003), this chapter has 
extended these viewpoints to incorporate financial market exposure. When occupational 
pensions are capital funded, the financial market performance of the plan’s assets has a 
direct impact on the overall costs of the pension plan, while opportunities to exert control 
over global financial markets are severely limited. Financialization, or the growing 
influence of financial markets over the productive economy and society, thus changes the 
trade-off between risk and control over occupational pensions in a profound way.  
 That the influence of financial markets over pension politics should not be 
underestimated is indicated by the fact that the financial crisis of 2001 provided the impetus 
for major pension reform in both political economies studied here: the Pension Protection 
Act in the United States and the Pension Act in the Netherlands. Among other things, the 
Pension Protection Act legally required full funding of DB pension plans and increased 
PBGC premiums. With the Act, the Bush Administration hoped to strengthen DB pension 
plans, which American employers were abandoning at full speed. In the Netherlands, 
meanwhile, the 2006 Pension Act similarly introduced new financial rules for pension 
funds. The Act institutionalized the hybridization of DB pension plans, a development 
originating from the late 1990s. Contrary to the United States, Dutch employers used 
consultative bodies such as the Socio-Economic Council to shape the new pension 
legislation in light with their preferences, for instance in the area of solvency requirements. 
Absent such institutions in the United States, American business groups joined forces in a 
political lobby to avoid additional financial obligations for employers, with limited success.  
 It is important to note that neither in the United States, nor in the Netherlands 
business groups were driving forces behind the pension reforms. Instead, the state took the 
initiative. Once reform plans were announced, business tried to shape them in their 
interests. For instance, American business groups joined forces in an extensive lobby 
against the funding provisions of the Pension Protection Act, while in the Netherlands 
business and labor jointly worked on new financial rules. American and Dutch business 
groups were outright antagonistic, when it came to the harmonization of international 
accounting standards, that would result in more stringent reporting requirements for DB 
pension liabilities. As shareholder value has become the driving force behind corporate 
activities, DB pension liabilities are increasingly at odds with the expectations from 
investors, credit agencies and other financial market insiders. These findings confirm that 
employers’ preferences vis-à-vis occupational pensions are not just motivated by cost 
considerations, but also by the position of the firm in the financialized political economy.      
When it comes to the financial politics of occupational pensions, business and labor 
in both political economies did not always find themselves at opposing sides of the political 
debate. This makes sense, since investment of pension assets holds similar promises, but 
also threats for both parties: high rates of return might reduce contributions or increase 
benefits, while low rates of return threaten funding levels and could result in higher 
contributions or lower benefits. For this reason, both business and labor groups in the 
United States supported funding relief for DB plans after the financial crisis of 2008, while 
the Dutch social partners jointly drafted new solvency requirements for pension funds in 
the wake of the 2001 crisis. Opposition between business and labor has been more 
pronounced, however, when it comes the use of pension investments for secondary 
purposes, such as politically-oriented shareholder campaigns. On this issue, American 
business and labor have been diametrically opposed, as the latter has embraced shareholder 
activism as a new political strategy. Here the difference with the Dutch case is most 
apparent: Dutch unions have been reluctant to adopt an activist investment platform, 
because they fear jeopardizing their institutionalized position within Dutch corporatism. 
In short, both American and Dutch employers are withdrawing their support from 
DB occupational pension plans. In the United States, employers have terminated DB plans 
in favor of DC pensions or have adopted other “de-risking” strategies to avoid the large 
liabilities associated with DB pensions. In the Netherlands, employers have so far avoided 
a widespread adoption of DC plans. Instead, they have placed DB pension liabilities “at a 
distance” from the sponsoring corporation in order to limit their exposure to financial risks. 
These developments cannot be explained by distributive factors alone. As business 
opposition to international accounting standards in both political economies shows, 
employers also experience strains of an increasingly financialized political economy in the 
areas of corporate finance and corporate governance. Whereas corporatist governance in 
the Netherlands has been able to smoothen the effects of financialization to a larger extent 
than in the United States, the threats and opportunities facing employers in both political 
economies are remarkably similar. The position of employers within the financialized 
political economy should therefore be incorporated into scholarship on business interests.  




ABN AMRO. 2014. ABN AMRO Settles Agreement on New Pension Scheme for
 Employees in the Netherlands. [press release] 16 June 2014. Available at:
 <https://www.abnamro.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2014/abn-amro-settles
 agreement-on-new-pension-scheme-for-employees-in-the-netherlands.html>
 [Accessed 13 September 2017]. 
 
American Benefits Council. 2004. Pensions at the Precipice: The Multiple Threats
 Facing Our Nation’s Defined Benefit Pension System. Washington (DC):
 American Benefits Council.  
 
American Benefits Council. 2005. Funding Our Future: A Safe and Sound Approach to
 Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding Reform. Washington (DC): American
 Benefits Council.  
 
American Benefits Council. 2010. Comment on Proposed Rule regarding Reportable
 Events under ERISA Section 4043 (RIN 1212-AB06), addressed to the U.S.
 Department of Office of Regulations and Interpretations Employee Benefits
 Security Administration, 22 January. [online] Available at:
 <https://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/pub/?ID=e6100fcd-9f5b-d8eb-88cc
 9e17b8aa08f7> [Accessed 22 November 2017].  
 
American Benefits Council. 2012. Defined Benefit Pension Plans: A Six-Point Plan to
 Address the Accelerated Exodus. November 28. [online]. Available at:
 https://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/pub/?id=e6127161-feb8-3c34-cd67
 cc53d574e44a [Accessed 1 January 1 2018].  
 
American Benefits Council et al. 2011. Oppose Proposals to Increase PBGC Premiums for
 Employers. Joint letter to U.S. Congress, 6 June. [online] Available at:
 <http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/20110606_PBGC_
 _Joint_Letter_on_Premiums_June2011.pdf> [Accessed 7 October 2017].  
 
Bridgen, P. and T. Meyer. 2009. The Politics of Occupational Pension Reform in Britain
 and the Netherlands: The Power of Market Discipline in Liberal and Corporatist
 Regimes. West European Politics 32(3): 586-610. 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2016. Table 47: Defined benefit plans: Plan sponsor, private 
industry workers, 2015. National Compensation Survey [online]. Available at:
 <data.bls.gov> [Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2017. Table 1: Retirement benefits: Access, participation, and
 take-up rates, March 2017. National Compensation Survey [online]. Available at:
 <data.bls.gov> [Accessed 29 December 2017].  
 
Butijn, H. and W. Schoutendorp. 1995. ABP schiet bedrijven te hulp bij vijandige
 overnames. Trouw 23 December.  
 
Commissie voor Corporate Governance. 1997. Corporate Governance in Nederland. De
 Veertig Aanbevelingen. [online] Available at: <http://www.mccg.nl/commissie
 peters. [Accessed 22 November 2017].  
 
Davis, G. 2009. Managed by the Markets. How Finance Reshaped America. Oxford:
 Oxford University Press.  
 
Dixon, A.D and A.H.B. Monk. 2009. The power of finance: accounting harmonization’s
 effect on pension provision. Journal of Economy Geography 9(5): 619-639. 
 
De Nederlandsche Bank, henceforth DNB. 2013. Kortingen pensioenfondsen: 68
 pensioenfondsen rapporteren aan DNB een korting per 1 april 2013. [online]
 Available at: <http://www.dnb.nl/nieuws/nieuwsoverzicht-en-archief/nieuws
 2013/dnb285723.jsp> [Accessed 22 November 2017].   
DNB. 2014. Minder pensioenfondsen moeten pensioen verlagen bij einde 5 jaar
 herstelplannen [online]. Available at:
 <http://www.dnb.nl/nieuws/nieuwsoverzicht-en-archief/nieuws
 2014/dnb302908.jsp>  [Accessed 22 November 2017].   
DNB. 2017a. T8.17 Onder Toezicht staande pensioenfondsen, Register Pensioenfondsen
 [online]. Available at: <http://www.dnb.nl/statistiek/statistieken-dnb/financiele
 instellingen/pensioenfondsen/register/index.jsp> [Accessed 22 November 2017].  
 
DNB. 2017b. Consolidatie pensioenfondsen zet door. DNBulletin. 27 August 2017.
 Available at: <https://www.dnb.nl/nieuws/nieuwsoverzicht-en-archief/dnbulletin
 2017/dnb362426.jsp> [Accessed 11 November 2017].  
 
Ebbinghaus, B. 2011. The Varieties of Pension Governance: Pension Privatization in
 Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 
Ebbinghaus, B and T. Wiβ. 2011. Taming Pension Fund Capitalism in Europe: Collective
 and State Regulation in Times of Crisis. Transfer: European Review of Labour
 and Research 18(1): 15-28.  
 
Epstein, G. 2005. Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy. In
 Financialization and the World Economy, eds. G. Epstein. Northampton (MA):
 Edward Elgar. 3-16. 
Estevez-Abe, M. 2001. The forgotten link. The financial regulation of Japanese pension
 funds in comparative perspective. In Comparing welfare capitalism: Social policy
 and political economy in Europe, Japan and the USA, eds. B. Ebbinghaus and P.
 Manow. London: Routledge. 190-214.  
 
Ghilarducci, T. 2008. When I’m Sixty-Four. The Plot Against Pensions and the Plan to
 Save Them. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Hacker, J. 2002. The Divided Welfare State. The Battle over Public and Private Social
 Benefits in the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hacker, J. 2004. Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden
 Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States. American Political
 Science Review 98(2): 243-260. 
Hacker, J. and P. Pierson. 2002. Business power and social policy: employers and the
 formation of the American welfare state. Politics & Society 30(2): 277-325. 
 
Halonen, D. 2010. Compromise hinted to restart DB funding relief bill. Pensions &
 Investments 11 January.  
 
Hebb, T. 2008. No Small Change. Pension Funds and Corporate Engagement. Ithaca
 (NY): Cornell University Press.  
 
Korpi, W. 2006. Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations
 of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and
 Antagonists. World Politics 58(2): 167-206.  
Kosterlitz, J. 1989. That’s My Money! National Journal 25 February.  
 
Maher, B. 2016. Pension De-Risking. Faculty Articles and Papers 352. [online]
 Available at: <http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/law_papers/352> [Accessed 22
 November 2017].  
 
Mares, I. 2003. The Sources of Business Interest in Social Insurance: Sectoral versus
 National Differences. World Politics 55(2): 229-258.  
 
McCarthy, M.A. 2017. Dismantling Solidarity. Capitalist Politics and American
 Pensions. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press. 
 
Meyer, T. and P. Bridgen. 2012. Business, Regulation and Welfare Politics in Liberal
 Capitalism. Policy & Politics 40(3): 387-403.  
 
Mitchell, O. 2014. Public Pension Pressures in the United States. In When States Go
 Broke. The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal
 Crisis, eds. P. Conti-Brown and D. Skeel. Cambridge: Cambridge University
 Press. 57-76. 
 
Munnell, A., J-P. Aubry and D. Muldoon. 2008. The Financial Crisis and Private Defined
 Benefit Plans. Issue in Brief 8-18. Boston: Center for Retirement Research.  
 
Nijhof, E. 2009. Pensions and Providence: Dutch Employers and the Creation of Funded
 Pension Schemes. Enterprise & Society 10(2): 265-303.  
OECD. 2017a. Assets as Share of GDP. Funded Pension Indicators. [online] Available
 at: <stats.oecd.org> [Accessed 17 October 17 2017].   
 
OECD. 2017b. Pension Markets in Focus 2017. Paris: OECD. [online]. Available at: <
 http://www.oecd.org/pensions/private-pensions/Pension-Markets-in-Focus
 2017.pdf> [Accessed 22 November 2017].   
 
Paster, T. 2013. Business and Welfare State Development: Why Did Employers Accept
 Social Reforms? World Politics 65(3). 416-451.  
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 2015. Pension Data Tables [online]. Available at:
 <https://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2015-Pension-Data-Tables.pdf> [Accessed 22
 November 2017].    
Perry, J. and A. Nölke. 2006. The Political Economy of International Accounting
 Standards. Review of International Political Economy 13(4): 559-586.  
Sass, S.A. 1997. The Promise of Private Pensions. The First Hundred Years. Cambridge
 (MA): Harvard University Press. 
 
Stichting van de Arbeid. 2004. Hoofdlijnen voor de regeling van het financiële toezicht
 op pensioenfondsen in de Pensioenwet. The Hague: STAR.   
 
STAR Stichting van de Arbeid. 2013. Nadere reactie van de Stichting van de Arbeid op
 het voorontwerp van de Wet invoering reële ambitieovereenkomst. [online]
 Available at:
 <https://www.stvda.nl/~/media/Files/Stvda/Nota/2010_2019/2013/20130911
 reactie-Stichting-spelregels-pensioenfondsen.ashx> [Accessed 12 October, 2017].  
 
Swenson, P. 1991. Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered:
 Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial
 Relations in Denmark and Sweden. World Politics 43(4): 513-544.  
 
Swinkels, L. 2011. Have pension plans changed after the introduction of IFRS? Pensions:
 An International Journal 16(4): 244-255.  
 
Tamerus, J. 2011. Defined Ambition. Een Noodzakelijke Stap in de Evolutie van het
 Pensioencontract naar een Duurzaam Evenwicht tussen ‘Willen en Kunnen’.
 Delft: Eburon.  
 
Tamminga, M. 1995. Beheerders pensioenen voor soepeler bescherming. NRC
 Handelsblad 7 October: 15.  
 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 2012. Private Retirement Benefits in the 21st Century: A
 Path Forward. Washington DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 2013. The PBGC Looking Forward. A U.S. Chamber
 Position Paper on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation [online]. Available
 at:<https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/021456_LA
 R_PBGC_FullReport_FIN.pdf> [Accessed 13 October 2017]. 
 
U.S. Department of Labor. 2007. Advisory Opinion 2007-07a. [online] Available at:
 <https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and
 advisers/guidance/advisoryopinions/2007-07a> [Accessed 8 October 2017].  
 
Van Bergen, W. 2005. Bedrijfspensioenfondsen: schuiven met risico’s. FEM Business 2
 July: 50-1.  
 
VNO-NCW. 2012. Rondje Europa. Essentieel voor onze welvaart. Den Haag: VNO
 NCW.  
 
VNO-NCW, 2017. Position Paper VNO-NCW ten behoeve van hoorzitting / ronde
 tafelgesprek Vaste Commissie Economische zaken Tweede Kamer d.d. 1 juni
 2017. [online]. Available at: https://www.vno-
 ncw.nl/sites/default/files/170530%20position%20paper%20TK%20overname.pdf
 [accessed 1 January 2018].  
 
Werkgroep Evaluatieonderzoek Convenant Arbeidspensioenen. 2001. Rapport
 Evaluatieonderzoek Convenant Arbeidspensioenen. Den Haag: Sociaal
 Economische Raad.  
Wiβ, T. 2015. Pension Fund Vulnerability to the Financial Market Crisis: The Role of
 Trade Unions. European Journal of Industrial Relations 21(2): 131-147.  
World Bank. 1994. Averting the Old Age Crisis. Policies to Protect the Old and Promote
 Growth. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Van der Zwan, N. 2011. Contentious Capital: The Politics of Pension Investment in
 the United States and Germany, 1974-2003. PhD. New School for Social
 Research.  
 
Van der Zwan, N. 2014. Making Sense of Financialization. Socio-Economic Review
 12(1): 99-129.  
Van der Zwan, N. 2017. Financialisation and the Pension System: Lessons from the
 United States and the Netherlands. Journal of Modern European History 15(4):
 554-578.  
 
Zelinsky, E. 2007. The Origins of the Ownership Society. How the Defined Contribution
 Paradigm Changed America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
